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The primary challenge that AI presents to the U. S. broiler industry is the public perception of the danger 
of a human disease, as opposed to the actual threat of a devastating outbreak of an avian disease in our 
domestic flocks.  Frankly, we are more afraid of an unjustified, unreasonable consumer flight from 
chicken than we are of getting the disease in our flocks.  There are a number of reasons for this 
conclusion, on a number of levels, from our assessment of the current lack of public understanding of 
the situation to the reasons for our confidence in our security from the avian disease. 
 
Concerning the public perception of this disease, a distinction should be made between the human 
disease and the avian disease.  This distinction does not always come through clearly in media reports.  
Public opinion surveys and questions and comments to industry members from friends, family, 
acquaintances, and even employees and growers indicate that many people think this is a disease easily 
acquired by casual contact with or consumption of poultry.  Currently, the Asian highly pathogenic 
H5N1 subtype of Avian Influenza (AI) (hereinafter referred as “Asian bird flu”) is strictly an avian 
disease with only sporadic human infections.  While the possibility of adaptation of this virus for 
efficient human transmission is a grave concern, and while public health agencies need to be preparing 
for a possible human pandemic (whether with Asian bird flu or some other subtype), many in the 
industry feel that certain experts and officials have overstated the current domestic threat.  The media 
can hardly be blamed for reporting some of these sensationalistic predictions, and we fear a public 
overreaction to future reports of any type of AI in birds of any sort, as occurred in Europe after the 
announcement of the disease in the Danube delta in the fall of 2005.  We do not mean to imply that 
reporting or discussion of this threat should be suppressed, only that the discussion should be based on 
science and reasonable probability, and reported in the proper context.  As discussed subsequently, the 
Asian bird flu currently does not exist in North America, we do not expect the avian form of the disease 
to come here, we are prepared to detect it and eradicate it if it does gain entry, infected meat is very 
unlikely to reach the consumer even if we have infected flocks, and normal handling and cooking 
practices will preclude human infection even if one were to consume an infected bird.  The industry and 
government agencies such as CDC and USDA are attempting to carry this message to the public, and we 
greatly appreciate the clear statement of the facts from these agencies.  The public is more likely to 
accept such assurances from a government agency than from the industry that is trying to sell them its 
product.  It is a difficult task to educate the public on such a complex issue, when the attention span of 
busy consumers is so short, and any mention of the subject immediately conjures up the doomsday 
scenarios that the media promote. 
 
The public health infrastructure for pandemic human influenza certainly needs shoring up.  The lack of 
capacity for human vaccine production in the United States represents a critical national security issue 
that demands immediate correction.  Public knowledge that effective vaccines and drugs would be 
readily available would go far to assuage concerns.  However, expending tremendous sums of money on 
stockpiling antiviral drugs that have a finite shelf life and that could potentially fall victim to viral 
resistance in a massive outbreak, while allowing the virus to continue to circulate at the source in the 
Asian poultry population seems counterintuitive.  As long as the virus continues to circulate in Asian 
poultry, the threat remains indefinitely.  The longer that situation exists, more opportunities for trans-Presented: Friday, February 17, 2006 
species infections will occur, and the greater the possibility that a human-adapted strain could eventually 
emerge.  More resources should be devoted to attempts to control the problem at the source, in the Asian 
poultry population.  Efforts to control and eliminate the avian form of the virus in domestic poultry in 
Asia, and to minimize the opportunities for human transfections, represent a more judicious application 
of resources compared to waiting for a human-adapted virus to emerge and then mounting a massive 
human pandemic response.  Controlling Asian bird flu in the village flocks of developing Asian nations 
is a daunting challenge, but certainly no worse than the current prospects for confronting a massive 
human pandemic.  The developed nations need to support the recommendations of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation for controlling this problem, with expert assistance on the ground, materiel 
resources, and yes, money. 
 
Let us turn now to the reasons for our confidence in our security from a massive domestic outbreak of 
the avian disease, or any other highly pathogenic form of Avian Influenza.  The domestic commercial 
poultry industries, in partnership with our state departments of agriculture and the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services (USDA 
APHIS VS), are well prepared to prevent, detect, and contain the threat of Asian bird flu, as well as 
other H5 and H7 subtypes, in our poultry populations.  There are multiple layers of protection currently 
in place. 
 
As of this writing in early January, 2006, the Asian bird flu has never been detected in any sort of bird, 
wild or domestic, commercial or non-commercial, in the United States.  Furthermore, infections with 
any H5 and H7 subtypes are very uncommon and are not tolerated in US commercial poultry.  We hope 
to keep it that way.  Wild waterfowl are the natural hosts for AI, and various subtypes, including other 
H5 and H7 subtypes, have always been and always will be found in those populations.  Detections in 
wild populations are expected.  We have lived with this situation for years, and such detections, while 
they bear monitoring, should not be cause for undue alarm.  Almost all birds in the US commercial 
poultry industries are raised in confinement in climate-controlled housing, and contact with wild 
waterfowl (or non-commercial poultry for that matter) is strictly prohibited.  Commercial poultry 
growers who are bird hunters are instructed not to use any clothing, shoes, etc for hunting that is used on 
the farm, and to shower and change all clothing after hunting and before returning to the poultry 
facilities.  There is only minor overlap of the Asian and North American wild bird migratory flyways, 
and wild bird populations are being monitored for the Asian bird flu in Alaska.  Wildlife biologists are 
now saying that the evidence seems to indicate that migratory birds do not appear to be a major factor in 
disseminating this disease.  Detection of the Asian H5N1 subtype in North American waterfowl would 
lead to further precautions to prohibit any contact with commercial birds. 
 
Infections with various subtypes of AI also occur sporadically in non-commercial and backyard flocks.  
AI, including a low pathogenic H7N2 strain, circulates in the live bird marketing systems of the 
northeastern United States.  The commercial industry also makes efforts to isolate itself from these 
operations.  USDA APHIS VS, in cooperation with the involved states and the live bird marketing 
industry, has initiated an AI control program for the live bird marketing system.  This program is 
reducing the incidence of AI in these systems, with the eventual goal of eradication. 
 
The United States does not import poultry or poultry products from any regions affected by highly 
pathogenic AI.  More than 99 percent of all the chicken consumed in the United States is produced in the 
United States, with the rest imported from Canada. Inspections have always been in place at all 
international ports of entry to exclude products that might represent a disease threat to domestic 
agriculture.  No live birds of any species from affected regions are permitted entry to the United States, Presented: Friday, February 17, 2006 
and any live birds imported from disease-free regions are quarantined and tested to preclude the 
introduction of a foreign disease such as AI.  It is common practice for U. S. broiler companies to 
discourage travel by employees and growers to areas with exotic poultry diseases, and/or to restrict 
contact with company poultry by persons who have traveled to such areas for 7 days after their return to 
the U. S.  While an introduction of the Asian bird flu virus into the commercial poultry of the United 
States is not impossible, the likelihood is currently very low.  A good test of this system is Exotic 
Newcastle Disease (END).  This disease is endemic around the world, including in numerous countries 
immediately to the south of us in this hemisphere.  While sporadic incursions have occurred, mainly via 
smuggling and contact with the backyard/game bird populations, the exclusion system has been 
effective.  The most recent incursion in California served to heighten our sensitivity and strengthen the 
system.  In particular, education of the backyard and game bird owners and increased surveillance of 
that segment have resulted, and should increase our level of protection. 
 
In the unlikely event that an introduction were to occur, we are prepared to detect it quickly and respond 
rapidly.  Our industries have biosecurity programs in place to minimize introductions of common 
domestic diseases such as infectious bronchitis or infectious laryngotracheitis into individual flocks.  
These programs also serve to decrease the risks of exposure to introduced exotic diseases.  Growers are 
trained to restrict visitors, minimize their own contact with other birds and farms, use dedicated 
protective clothing, disinfect shared equipment, and restrict access by rodents, wild birds, pets, 
livestock, and feral animals.  Most companies prohibit growers and employees from owning pet birds or 
keeping any sort of poultry other than those supplied by the company.  Essentially all commercial 
producers use all-in-all-out systems.  There is a complete break between each and every flock.  In the U. 
S. integrated system, the hatcheries, feed mills, live haul operations, and supervisory and support 
personnel are fully dedicated to a single production complex, so there is little crossover between 
different companies.  This segregates the industry in a given area into smaller units in terms of personnel 
contact.  Contact via ancillary services such as utilities, bedding suppliers, and so forth, and by other 
routes such as airborne exposure, remain a concern because the farms allied to different complexes may 
be geographically intermingled.  However, in areas with multiple companies, it is becoming common 
practice to develop industry disease control committees.  Such committees contain at least one 
representative from each producing company (often the company veterinarian and/or live production 
managers), and are often organized under the auspices of the state poultry federation, state department of 
agriculture, or the state or university diagnostic laboratory system.  These committees exist to develop 
industry-wide approaches to disease control, and are particularly effective because the procedures are 
developed and agreed upon by the industry.  One of the most outstanding examples of this approach is 
the Delmarva Poultry Industry, Inc. (DPI).  This industry group was largely responsible for containing 
the incursion of low pathogenic H7N2 AI in Delaware and Maryland in 2004, and did an outstanding 
job.  DPI has also pioneered in the area of individual farm risk assessment and mitigation.  A 
comprehensive survey instrument has been developed to score individual farms for disease risk.  
Companies can then systematically address those farms with the highest scores, and progressively 
reduce company and area-wide risk.  All risks are listed and evaluated, but mitigation efforts are focused 
on those that are amenable to correction.  For instance, proximity to heavily traveled highways is a risk, 
but little can be done to mitigate it, whereas failure to control rodent harborages can be addressed.  All 
of these procedures will minimize the initial spread of any introduced foreign disease prior to its 
detection in the signal flock. 
 
Our commercial poultry populations have been actively monitored for the presence of AI for a number 
of years, to meet international trade requirements.  Large numbers of broiler flocks have been tested for 
export to Mexico.  A National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) monitoring plan for breeder hens has 
been in existence for several years.  This program is especially useful because breeders serve as a Presented: Friday, February 17, 2006 
sensitive sentinel system, due to their long lives.  A number of states have separate breeder monitoring 
programs in addition to the NPIP program.  These monitoring programs are now being intensified and 
expanded to commercial broiler, turkey, and layer flocks.  In response to the low pathogenicity H7N2 AI 
outbreak in Virginia in 2002, the NPIP has developed an active and passive monitoring and containment 
program for commercial broilers, turkeys, and layers.  At this writing, this program is in the final stages 
of approval and implementation.  We urge USDA to proceed with all due speed in implementing this 
expanded NPIP AI program. 
 
The National Chicken Council (NCC) has developed and promoted to both members and non-members 
a testing program to ensure consumers that chicken flocks and the food products made from them are 
free of potentially hazardous forms of AI.  The NCC represents integrated chicken producer-processors, 
the companies that produce, process and market chickens. Member companies of NCC account for 
approximately 95 percent of the chicken sold in the United States.  The NCC program is based on the 
NPIP program and is being implemented pending final approval and implementation of the NPIP 
program.  Under the NCC program, participating companies will take samples from each flock while it 
is still on the farm.  Tests will be conducted at approved laboratories.  Any flock found to have avian 
influenza of the H5 or H7 subtypes will be promptly and humanely destroyed on the farm and disposed 
of in an environmentally acceptable manner.  None of the birds will be sent to the processing plant or 
otherwise enter the food chain.  The NCC plan calls for the establishment of a control zone two miles 
around any affected flock in which other flocks would be held and tested weekly until slaughter, 
ensuring that flocks are clear of H5/H7 avian influenza before going to market.  Companies are required 
to report their findings monthly to NCC, to keep records of flocks tested under the program, and to have 
audits conducted by independent, third party auditors at least once per year. 
 
Most diagnostic laboratories have been testing flocks with any signs remotely suggestive of AI for the 
disease, and such passive monitoring programs are required in the proposed NPIP program.  Finally, the 
signs of a disease such as the Asian bird flu are so dramatic that there is almost no possibility that it 
would go undetected in the integrated commercial system.  The industry has conducted awareness 
programs for growers and industry supervisors and managers.  Growers and managers are continuously 
concerned with the health and performance of their flocks for economic reasons, and for that reason 
alone tend to be very vigilant.  Industry managers and veterinarians are cognizant of the steps necessary 
to quarantine suspect flocks and obtain a rapid diagnosis. 
 
In the event of a case of any H5 or H7 subtype AI in broilers, whether under the NCC program, the 
NPIP program, or federal, state, or local programs, the flock would be quarantined and destroyed on site.  
A low pathogenic outbreak is more likely than a highly pathogenic outbreak, but in either case the flock 
would be destroyed.  Proven methods for accomplishing this unpleasant task in a humane, expeditious, 
environmentally sound, and safe manner are now in place in most major broiler producing areas.  A 
quarantine zone around any infected flocks would be established and intensive monitoring begun.  The 
most recent incursions, in Delmarva and Texas, were quickly detected and eliminated in this manner.  
Most areas are now prepared to respond as quickly, and any outbreak in commercial poultry would be 
rapidly contained.  We have new information about protecting the workers that would be necessary to 
deal with the infected flocks.  One advantage to the US commercial system is that relatively few people 
are exposed to the live birds during the production of tremendous amounts of poultry product, making 
the sorts of human infections seen in Asia even less likely.  It is also highly unlikely that any infected 
birds would ever make it to slaughter, so exposure of processing plant workers or consumers to infected 
raw meat is unlikely.  Finally, if some infected birds did manage to make it past all these hurdles, normal 
safe handling and cooking practices would effectively preclude a human infection among consumers. 
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In summary, the risk of an introduction of Asian bird flu into our commercial poultry is currently very 
low, and we are well prepared to detect and expeditiously handle any incursion that does occur.  Finally, 
even in the event of an outbreak, the risks to the farmers, workers, and consumers in our system would 
remain minimal. U. S. BROILER INDUSTRY 
AND THE AI CHALLENGE
John A. Smith DVM, MS, MAM
Fieldale Farms CorporationPrimary Challenge:  Public 
Perception
• We fear an unjustified consumer flight from 
chicken more than the risk of a devastating 
disease in our domestic flocks
• There are a number of reasons for this 
conclusion, on a number of levels:
– Assessment of the current lack of public 
understanding
– Confidence in our security from the avian 
diseasePublic Perception:  Human vs. 
Avian Disease
• Asian highly pathogenic H5N1 bird flu is an avian 
disease with sporadic human cases in persons with 
intimate contact with diseased birds
• While the possibility of adaptation for efficient 
human transmission is a real concern, and
• While public health agencies need to be preparing 
for the next pandemic (whether H5N1 or another 
strain)…Human vs. Avian Disease
• Many in industry feel that some experts and 
officials have overstated the current 
domestic threat, and the media respond
• We fear a public overreaction to future 
reports of any type of AI in birds of any sort
• Discussion/reporting should be based on 
science and reasonable probabilities and 
reported in the proper contextCurrent Situation
• Asian H5N1 does not exist in N. America
• We do not expect it to come here
• We are prepared to detect and contain it 
should it gain entry
• Infected meat is extremely unlikely to reach 
the consumer
• Proper handling and cooking precludes 
infectionConsumer Assurance
• Industry, CDC, USDA are carrying this 
message to consumers
• The government is more credible than the 
industry that has the product to sell
• Public education is difficult—complex 
issue, short attention spans, immediate 
recollection of sensationalistic sound bitesPublic Health Infrastructure 
Needs Improvement
• Lack of domestic human vaccine capacity is 
a critical national security issue
• Ready availability of vaccines and drugs 
would assuage public concerns
• Stockpiling drugs (with a finite shelf life 
and susceptibility to resistance) while 
allowing continued viral circulation at the 
source is counterintuitivePublic Health Approach
• As long as the virus circulates in Asian 
poultry, the threat remains; the longer it 
persists, the more opportunities for human 
infections occur, and the greater the chances 
of eventual emergence of a human-adapted 
strainPublic Health Approach
• More resources should be devoted to 
control at the source—Asian poultry 
populations
• Control in Asian poultry, and reduction of 
human exposure, is a more judicious 
application of resources vs. waiting for 
emergence of a human-adapted virus and 
mounting a human pandemic responsePublic Health Approach
• Controlling AI in the village flocks of 
developing Asian nations will be a daunting 
challenge; severe lack of infrastructure
• Is it any more daunting than the current 
prospects for confronting a massive human 
pandemic?
• FAO, OIE, and APEC have made 
recommendations; these need supportDomestic Industry Preparedness
• The domestic commercial poultry 
industries, with the states and the USDA 
APHIS VS, are well prepared to prevent, 
detect, and contain Asian bird flu, as well as 
other H5 and H7 subtypes
• Multiple layers of protection are in place
• These protections need continued funding 
supportCurrent Domestic Threat Level
• Asian high path H5N1 has never been detected in 
any sort of bird, wild or domestic, commercial or 
non-commercial, in the United States
• H5 and H7 are very uncommon, and are not 
tolerated, in US commercial poultry
• While wild waterfowl are the natural hosts, US 
commercial birds are isolated from wild birds
• There is only minor overlap of Asian and North 
American flyways, and wild birds are being 
monitored in Alaska; role of migratory waterfowl 
is currently being questionedCurrent Domestic Threat Level
• AI occurs sporadically in non-commercial 
(backyard) flocks; low path H7N2 circulates in the 
northeastern live bird marketing system (LBMS)
• Commercial birds are also isolated from these 
flocks
• A state-federal-industry program to control and 
eliminate H5/H7 AI from the LBMS is reducing 
the incidence, with the goal of eradicationCurrent Domestic Threat Level
• The US does not import any live birds or poultry 
products from regions affected with HPAI
• Inspections at all points of entry are intended to 
exclude all foreign plant and animal diseases that 
threaten domestic agriculture
• Animals and birds imported from disease-free 
regions are quarantined and tested to exclude 
foreign diseases
• Companies limit employee travel to affected areasDomestic Industry Preparedness
• Summary:  while an introduction of Asian 
bird flu into domestic poultry populations is 
not impossible, it currently is highly 
unlikely; Example: END control has been 
largely successful
• What if it still gained entry?  We are 
prepared to detect it quickly and respond 
rapidlyDomestic Industry Preparedness
• Existing biosecurity programs, designed to 
limit spread of common endemic diseases, 
should also limit spread of an introduced 
disease prior to detection
• Restriction of visitors, prohibition of 
contact with other birds and farms, 
protective clothing, disinfection of 
equipment, rodent/feral animal control, etc.Domestic Industry Preparedness
• Growers and employees are prohibited from 
owning pet birds or other poultry
• All-in-all-out systems provide a complete 
break between flocks
• Integrated structure isolates all production 
steps into discrete packages
• Ancillary services and geographical overlap 
remain a concernDomestic Industry Preparedness
• In areas with multiple companies, industry 
disease control committees are common
•> One rep from each company, under 
auspices of poultry federation, state ag dept, 
or state/university diagnostic lab system
• Develop industry-wide disease control 
programs; effective because of industry 
buy-in; DPI is an excellent exampleDomestic Industry Preparedness
• Active monitoring for AI has been ongoing 
for years:
– Testing of broiler flocks for Mexican export
– NPIP “US AI Clean” program for breeders
– State monitoring programs
• These programs are being intensified and an 
NPIP program is expanding to production 
flocks of broilers, turkeys, and egg layersNCC Testing Program
• Program to ensure consumers that flocks 
and the food products from them are free of 
potentially hazardous forms of AI
• NCC members produce 95% of US chicken
• Each flock is sampled on the farm, tests 
conducted at approved labs
• Any flock with any H5 or H7 will be 
humanely destroyed on the farmNCC Testing Program
• No infected birds will be sent to processing 
or otherwise enter the food chain
• A two-mile control zone will be established 
around any infected flock, and all flocks in 
the zone tested weekly until slaughter
• Monthly reports submitted to NCC
• Yearly audits by independent auditorsDomestic Industry Preparedness
• Passive surveillance, consisting of 
diagnostic tests on any flock with signs 
remotely resembling AI, has been in place 
for several years in most states, and is 
incorporated into the new NPIP program
• Such a dramatic disease is very unlikely to 
go undetected in the commercial systemDomestic Industry Preparedness
• Growers and managers have an economic 
stake in the health and performance of the 
birds, so tend to be very vigilant
• The industry has conducted grower and 
management awareness training
• Managers and veterinarians are well versed 
in the procedures to quarantine suspect 
flocks and obtain a rapid diagnosisHandling of an actual case
• Any case of H5 or H7 AI in a domestic flock 
would result in immediate quarantine of the flock 
with destruction on site
• Low path is more likely, but would be handled the 
same
• Proven methods of large-scale euthanasia and 
disposal that are humane, expeditious, 
environmentally sound, and safe for workers are 
availableHandling of an actual case
• A quarantine zone would be established 
around all cases, with intensive monitoring
• Worker protection is now a priority
• In the US commercial system, relatively 
few people are exposed to the live birds 
during the production of tremendous 
amounts of poultry products, making human 
exposure less of a problem than in AsiaHandling of an actual case
• It is highly unlikely that any infected flocks 
would make it to slaughter, precluding 
exposure of plant workers or consumers to 
raw meat from infected birds
• Finally, if all these hurdles were breached, 
and meat from infected birds made it to 
market, proper handling and cooking 
procedures would preclude infectionSummary
• The risk of introduction of Asian bird flu into the 
domestic commercial poultry population is 
currently very low
• We are well prepared to detect and contain any 
incursion that might occur, but funding is critical
• Even in the event of an outbreak, the risks to 
farmers, poultry workers, and consumers is 
minimal under the US system